Recently, Malacañang issued Executive Order (EO) 24 s. 2023, creating the Disaster Response and Crisis Management Task Force. The Task Force, per EO 24, shall primarily “oversee and coordinate the preparation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) plans, programs, projects, and activities on disaster preparedness and response.”
EO 24 seems to be this administration’s response to the perennial clamor to fix our institutional set-up in handling disasters. Since the 17th Congress, legislative proposals and experts’ commentaries have sought the creation of a stand-alone, dedicated agency — a Department of Disaster Resilience or DRRM Authority in charge of disasters. However, the proposed Department has been set aside due to calls for rightsizing, gridlock among contentious provisions, and the inconclusive stance of the Chief Executive.
Will the Task Force bring solutions to the problems on the ground? Will the Task Force become another ad hoc coordinative body which will duplicate the functions of the current NDRRMC (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council)?
Foremost, the Philippines’ Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Law or RA No. 10121 established a 44-member inter-agency body, the NDRRMC, for “policymaking, coordination, supervision, integration, monitoring.” The law named the Department of National Defense (DND) head as the NDRRMC Chairperson, the Department of Science and Technology head as Vice-Chairperson for Prevention and Mitigation, the Department of the Interior and Local Government for Preparedness, the Department of Social Welfare and Development for Response and Relief, and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for Rehabilitation and Recovery. Implementation of programs, projects, and activities is “shared” among NDRRMC members with the Office of Civil Defense, an office under the DND, as the Technical Secretariat. The law lumped together 16 functions of the NDRRMC and tasked the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) with 18 functions. However, the law and its IRR did not specify functions for the Vice-Chairpersons.
On the other hand, the Task Force shall provide leadership, collaborate with relevant agencies, exercise oversight, manage and oversee the implementation of disaster programs, in coordination with agencies and stakeholders, a task which is embedded in the NDRRMC functions per the law. The President is yet to designate the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson from among the members of the Task Force which comprises a subset of member-agencies of the NDRRMC, namely, the agencies mentioned above, with the departments of Health, Trade and Industry, Public Works and Highways, and Transportation.
As a background, this is not the first time that Philippine government created ad hoc bodies for disasters. For a country which ranked 1st in the 2022 World Risk Report, we had Task Force Yolanda, Task Force Bangon Marawi, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery, and the Boracay Inter-Agency Task Force, among others. It is difficult to find a comprehensive written report to assess the performance of these bodies.
This piece attempts to answer the banner question above by highlighting some local experiences and views.
1. The current system fails to address the huge disparity in local governments’ disaster information and actions. In specific terms, we still hear of some local authorities who failed to anticipate disaster impacts and threats. Our institutional policies bank on the ideal that local governments should and can manage disasters. Local governments, down to barangays, should have Local DRRM Offices and inter-office 21-member Local DRRM Councils answerable to the Local Chief Executives. When support is needed, LGUs call on the next level LGU (municipal-provincial) or the appropriate national agency — for instance, the Bureau of Fire Protection or Coast Guard for search and rescue.
However, reality tells us that not all can achieve the same standards. When push comes to shove, LGUs need not be referred to multiple “coordinating” agencies regarding assistance. EO 24’s Task Force will merely “oversee and coordinate efforts” among various agencies and LGUs, and this does not equate to holding accountability, especially in implementation down to the local level.
2. Dispersed accountability and resources at the national level resulted in a multitude of plans, protocols, systems, and tools not being fully utilized and implemented.
Studies show that there are about 18 required plans and documents expected from LGUs related to disasters (Philippines Voluntary Report of Sendai MTR). These include: Local DRRM Plans, Contingency Plans for each hazard, Pre-Disaster Risk Assessment Actions, and Programs, Protocols, Rehabilitation Plan, among others. The current state of government efforts to check and evaluate could only go so far up to compliance (presence or absence).
Assessing whether these plans are implemented and are effective might be futile because the many plans, protocols, systems, and tools disperse local resources and absorptive capacity. The same report tells us that the average permanent staff for Local DRRM Offices is about six persons for cities and one to three for municipalities.
Instead of waiting for all LGUs to complete and implement a multitude of plans, a stand-alone, independent agency can work and seriously consolidate (or collapse) these plans and requirements to come up with an action program.
3. Local DRRM workers think that the dismal state of infrastructure, equipment, and manpower in disasters can be resolved by having a dedicated agency.
LGUs need infrastructure support and adequately trained civilian protection corps for various skills such as urban search and rescue, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and pandemic response. Currently, some of these skills sets and infra support can be found among various government agencies. A Development Investment Program tied to an agency should cover technology and equipage upgrading like securing uninterrupted utilities and internet connection. At present, unsustainable semi-formal arrangements among agencies characterize disaster response.
Studies show underutilization of Local DRRM Funds (5% of an LGUs’ annual estimated revenues) by as high as 80% (Domingo, S. and Manejar, A., 2021). But LGUs struggle in implementing infrastructure projects and capital investments due to technical requirements and manpower constraints. (See the chapter of Magno, C., Capistrano, F., and Cases, S. et al., 2022 in a Report submitted to the UNDP.)
Hence, it should take a dedicated agency with manpower and budget to fill the gaps among these LGUs. Per Section 7 of EO 24, funds shall be sourced from existing appropriations of member-agencies. An option instead is to program these investments within the NDRRMC, with OCD as its Executive arm.
Perhaps the Task Force is an immediate measure to increase oversight and efficiency among the NDRRMC members without going through the tedious act of legislation. However, an ad hoc body may not seem a sustainable solution towards increasing Philippines preparedness for disasters.
Among other Asian countries belonging to the Top 10 most at-risk in the World Risk Index, only the Philippines and Myanmar do not have a dedicated ministry- or department-level agency for disaster risk management.
Lessons from past experiences tell stakeholders that ad-hoc task forces for disaster risk reduction are ineffective. The long-term reform is to create a department for national disaster management.
Kriszia Enriquez is an independent policy researcher on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management. She coordinates an advocacy group, Agap Banta, an open coalition of civil society and individual practitioners to enhance disaster preparedness in the Philippines.
