FOR the first time since the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin is fighting to defend the home front and not the frontline. He looks weaker, humiliated and more distracted than before mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin mounted his short-lived challenge, boosting the morale of Kyiv and allies amid a grueling counter-offensive that’s made slow progress.
But the West shouldn’t overplay a good hand. As historical parallels go, this seems less like 1917 than 1905 — when a mutiny on the Potemkin warship was repressed and didn’t morph into a revolution. Nothing suggests a game-changer on the battlefield yet. Ukraine’s allies should unite on a prudent “keep calm and carry on” line of beefing up assistance to Ukraine as much as possible for the counter-offensive this summer, and on hashing out a long-term security commitment to avoid widening divides among allies at a NATO summit in two weeks.
So far, Washington and European capitals have avoided the obvious traps associated with the ill-fated Wagner revolt. Officials have stayed tight-lipped and described the extraordinary cracks in the Kremlin’s facade of control as an “internal” matter for Russia — as did Putin’s allies in Beijing. Behind the scenes, the prospect of Moscow and its 6,000 nuclear warheads falling into the hands of an ultra-nationalist warlord wasn’t seen as a happy one. Still, the urge to avoid taking sides is such that US sanctions on Wagner’s operations may be delayed, the Wall Street Journal reported.
As the dust settles on the mutiny, the metaphor increasingly used by Western officials is that of a wounded animal: Weaker, but prone to lashing out. The unpredictability of an increasingly cornered Putin, who on Monday accused Ukraine’s allies of “rubbing their hands” at Russian instability, makes caution worthwhile. At the same time, neither Moscow nor Kyiv has any reason to shift diplomatic gears, and positions are likely to harden on both sides — something Bruno Lete of the German Marshall Fund calls a “hawkish tilt.” “Time to abandon false neutrality and fear of escalation,” Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba tweeted over the weekend.
This is where things get tricky. Unity among Kyiv’s backers has been strong — thanks especially to Putin — and boosting troops on NATO’s eastern flank looks a given, as Belarus plays a new role as haven for Wagner. But increasingly hawkish calls to integrate Ukraine into the military alliance will only draw starker lines between the likes of Poland or Estonia (and more recently France) and the US and Germany, currently more likely to see a Ukraine in NATO as locking in conflict with Russia rather than deterring Moscow, as Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations has defined the different camps.
It will be vital to find a compromise stance that takes into account the morale-boosting instability in Moscow without letting whirlwind events take over. That should mean focusing on unlocking the materiel Ukraine needs today, ramping up supplies and ammunition, alongside security guarantees that don’t yet amount to full membership: Aside from the technical impossibility of admitting a country in the midst of an invasion, a too-hasty integration of Kyiv could play into Russian propaganda, delay vital reforms and frustrate peace efforts down the line. Allies should be wary of over-promising a major policy shift on the road to Vilnius.
Professor Charles Kupchan, co-author of a Foreign Affairs piece in April outlining a new strategy for the West in Ukraine, argues that the focus remains bolstering Kyiv’s counter-offensive with a view to negotiating any exit from a stalemate on the best possible terms. “The way forward is steady as she goes,” he tells me. That means accelerating assistance to Ukraine, keeping discussions open with allies and keeping an eye on escalation risks. It’s a moment to step up support, but for now hopes for a post-Putin era are premature.
BLOOMBERG OPINION
